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An Alternative View to the   “Africa Dummy” 
Paulos Gutema* 
 
For the last four decades the pace of economic growth in African countries remained too slow 
or stagnant. This problem is analyzed by first developing a framework that focus on growth 
process of indigent economy, where deferring current consumption is hardly possible, and by 
relaxing the usual assumption of unfailing market condition. The analytic result suggests 
that the degree and direction of effects of factors of market failure make a difference in 
nations' level of income per capita as well as its rate of growth. On this ground, the poor 
economic performance observed in the region can be well attributed to poor capacity to manage 
and exploit factors of market failure. The empirical evidence obtained from analysis of panel 
data supports strongly this argument. 
 
Introduction 
After independence, according to World Bank (1989), Africans had high hopes of rapid 
development.  The leaders, being motivated by the end of colonialism, were determined 
that their countries should catch-up with the developed countries.  There was a widely 
prevailing saying like "we must run while they walk" to express their determinations and 
motivations. Despite these intentions the growth experience in the continent, especially, in 
SSA has been disappointing. After more than three decades of endeavor the income gap 
between the developed and SSA economies remained as wide as ever. For example, OECD 
report indicates, as noted by Madison (1996), that the income of the average African in 
1995 was roughly equal to the average income of some one living in Western Europe in 
1820. This information sounds like the region has lost 175 years in economic history.   
In terms of its dynamics, the story is equally alarming.  According to World 
Development Indicator data set1, GDP per capita average annual growth rate was only 
0.45% in the last four decades, which is far below that of the world’s average, which is 
1.93%. Moreover, from the data set it is possible to observe that the average annual rate of 
growth in real GDP per capita for the region declined from 2.64% per cent in the 1960s to 
about 0.83%% in 1970s and further declined to –1.12% and –0.68% in 1980s and 1990s 
respectively.  
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This poor performance is also in sharp contrast to the record of World’s average 
performances, where average annual rate of growth 3.34%, 1.91%, 1.43% and 0.96% were 
achieved for each decade of the above periods, respectively. In short, the above record 
confirms that economic growth in the region has been very slow or stagnant. This 
exceptional oddity will be the subject of this paper.  
 
In deed, this paper is neither the first nor will be the last to deal with the indicated 
problem. Rather the issue has been point of much concern for African specialists, 
development economists and other scholars. However, there is controversy and 
uncertainty as to the causes behind the problem. The debate relates to the degree of 
influence of adverse initial conditions2 and domestic policy mistakes. Certainly, absence of 
objective explanation of the problem has contributed to pending the solution to some 
extent. To worsen the matter, some researchers have observed the presence of some 
growth mystery that seems to be particularly associated to the region, after controlling for a 
number of characteristics falling in the two sets of causes. 
  
In his empirical study of economic growth, Barro (1991), for example, observes that 
“there appear to be adverse effects on growth from being in Sub Sahara Africa”, which 
was labeled as “Africa dummy” there after. In the study he indicated that, after 
controlling for the level of investment, school enrolment, government corruption and 
political instability, the dummy was associated with an annual decline in GDP per capita 
of as much as 1.14% during 1960-85.  Mauro (1995) estimate this decline to be between 
1.75% and 2.1%, after including bureaucratic efficiency index in his growth estimating 
equation. Similarly, Easterly and Levine (1997), after controlling for ethino-lingustic 
heterogeneity, estimate the effect of the dummy to range from 1.2% to 1.4% decline in 
annual GDP per capita, during 1960-1989.  
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In searching the factor behind this dummy, which is actually inimical to growth, Sachs 
and Warner (1997) attributed it to a mix of structural and policy variables particularly lack 
of openness to the world market. Barro (1997), on the other hand, attributed it to ratio of 
government consumption to GDP. That is, both studies attribute the dummy to policy 
distortions. Englebert (2000) goes further steps and asks ‘But what is it about Africa 
which is conducive to “bad” policy choices?’ and attributed it to state structure, 
particularly, to state legitimacy. Easterly and Levine (1997), on the other hand, stressing 
poor public choice to be the factor behind the dummy, describe how initial growth 
conditions themselves contribute to poor public policy choices. In solving the growth 
problem, in general, the implication of these findings will be correcting the policy mistakes. 
But, when comes to stating what the right policy is there is still some difficulties that 
deserves special consideration.   
 
In most of the indicated studies, the approach followed was trying to explain 
intercountry growth differences by looking for country characteristics that can explain 
the gaps. As Alesina (1998) notes, readers of the results of the approach often wonder 
which results are robust and which are not, since changes in specification lead to 
different results. As a result, what is meant by right policy will vary with the studies. This 
critical point requires us to look for an alternative approach with an objective way of 
specification and grounded on firm economic theory.  
 
On the other hand, exposing this growth problem to conventional growth models may 
give us an information that sounds like the region was not doing well in investing in 
accumulation of physical capital, human capital or research and development. But the 
basic question in this implication will be, whether the region remain poor perpetually if it 
fails to reverse the trend of the investments for some reasons, say due to poverty.  The 
information from the models may indicate that the region remains poor or remain 
performing poor, which gives no way out of the problem.  
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Before accepting this prediction for grant, it seems worth questioning whether this 
prediction is consistent with actual growth process that had taken place in the past in the 
today’s developed nations. That is, whether growth was induced by more investment in 
the indicated areas, when they were at the level where most African economies exist 
today. On the one hand, we observe that they have developed i.e. they did not remain at 
indigent level. On the other hand, we observe that the ‘more saving’ argument to 
contradict the general human behaviour3. The inconsistency between the prediction and 
growth history came to appear from the assumption made about the market structure 
with in which the poor agents act.  
 
II. Can an Indigent Agent Save? 
A close look at the process of wealth accumulation reveals that the process depends on 
the degree to which competitive equilibrium is ensured at any instant of time and the 
degree to which the equilibrium established at one moment will influence the rate at 
which assets are accumulated for the next moment. The former deals with the nature of 
goods and factor prices, while the later deals with the style of decision made on deferring 
consumption by saving more. In growth studies, however, we observe, most often, the 
first condition to be less emphasized as a result of the frequently imposed assumption of 
competitive equilibrium and the second being well stressed. Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988)4 that start from the conjecture of competitive equilibrium and assume away 
imperfect competition are good examples of this point. As Romer (1994) argues both 
models fail to be grounded on imperfect competition though they manage to include the 
endogenously provided technology5. However, as Solow (1997) argued the suitability of 
models constructed this way in solving growth problems facing the poor economies of 
the world can be questioned as these economies are characterized by severe market 
failures. 
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On the other side, the growth models rely heavily on the outcome of the decision made 
by the agents in choosing appropriate consumption time path. Romer [1986] model, for 
example, starts by considering that agents divide their current income between current 
consumption and investment in research technology that produces knowledge from 
forgone current consumption. Slight differently, Lucas [1988] human capital model starts 
by considering that agents allocate their non-leisure time between current production and 
human capital accumulation. In short, both pioneering endogenous growth models are 
based on attitude of agents’ that involves sacrifice of current utility for the sake of 
improved future welfare. In this approach, we understand that should the agents fail to 
save and to invest in physical capital accumulation or in human capital accumulation or 
in discovering new knowledges for some reasons, the consequence will be facing freezing 
growth. Thus, in the models, we observe that the agents’ forward-looking behavior, 
manifested through their decision on deferring current consumption, plays central role in 
triggering and sustaining growth. However, the central question here is whether deferring 
current consumption is actually possible for agents in indigent economy. Can a rational 
agent work towards forming a rich corpse? Doubtlessly, so far this agent is rational, S/he 
looks for means of today’s survival, rather than getting rich after death. If this behavioral 
assumption does not work, we have to set another assumption that says  indigent agents 
are irrational in making their decision, which is quite implausible. So under this 
circumstances, from where the savings come? On the other hand, if such actions (saving) 
failed to be taken by the agents, the models predict that the agents remain poor 
perpetually, which is not compatible with growth history of many today’s advanced 
economies. In general, from the point of deferring current consumption perspective, 
again, we observe that the suitability of the model in explaining the growth problem falls 
under question.  
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III. Where else to Look for Source of Growth: The Framework  
This section attempts to propose a tool that serves in describing growth process in 
indigent economies, where deferring current consumption is hardly possible, by invoking 
factors of market failure. Explaining the process of economic growth in indigent 
economy requires well-specified production function of the economy. To develop a 
production function for our idealized poor, first consider a given implicit production 
function as ( ) ( ) ( )( )tX,tLftY = . Where ( ) ( ) ( )tX andtL,tY are net out put, labor size and a row 
vector of factors of production that accumulates as a result of deferred current 
consumption, at point of time .t  By taking the total derivative, we get 
( ) ( ) ( )tdXftdLftdY
KL
+= . By assumption of no saving, which characterizes the idealized 
economy, we get ( ) 0=tdX and, hence  
( ) ( ) [ ]1ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚtdLftdY
L
= . 
 
As indicated in the preceding section, at least growth history of today’s developed 
countries can be a good reason to decline the prediction that nations remain poor if they 
fail to save. The inconsistency between the prediction and the reality arose from over 
simplifying assumption of competitive market structure, which hides some of the 
economic realities. Hence, lets try to relax this assumption and try to see what happens to 
per capita income growth of the indigent economy. Reconsider equation [1] and 
introduce factors of market failure.  
 
By factors of market failure it is meant here market incompleteness and competition 
imperfection. Incontrovertibly, markets between nature and human beings, between 
generations, between nations, between firms or social groups, between individuals are 
incomplete. That is exchange of factors of production and products are not carried out 
solely through market mechanism. Whenever and wherever they exist, they are not 
perfectly competitive. That is factors are not paid with the marginal value of their 
products.  
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Under the presence of these factors of market failure, we understand that marginal 
product of labor is equal to the sum of its level under unfailing market plus effects of the 
factors, as 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]2ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚtdLftdY
L
λε ++=  
where λε ,  are marginal effects of market incompleteness and imperfection in market 
competition, respectively. After making some manipulations6 growth rate of the 
aggregate output will be  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
[ ]31 ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚ
tL
tdL
tY
tdY
θ+=  
where 
( )
( ) ( )tLtY
λε
θ
+
≡ , the quantity that measures the degree and direction of relative effects 
of factors of market failure.  
[3] informs how growth of net national output takes place depending on exogenously 
determined labor growth and degree and direction of relative effects of factors of market 
failure in indigent economy. Taking the indefinite integral of both sides of [3], we get an 
explicit production function of the economy under consideration as  
( ) ( )( ) [ ]41 ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚθ+= tALtY  
Solving for per capita income growth,  
( )
( )
( )
( )
[ ]5ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚ
tL
tdL
ty
tdy
θ=  
[5] suggests that per capita income growth to be determined by effects of factors of 
market failure and labor growth. Taking the indefinite integral of [5], we find an explicit 
function associating effects of factors of market failure and labor to per capita income 
level as  
( ) ( ) [ ]6ΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚΚθtALty =  
Where A stands for real wage rate per year under unfailing market condition, or the initial 
natural endowment to the first person of the economy. 
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In general, from [5] and [6] we observe that the major endogenous source of growth and 
determinant of level of per capita income for indigent economy to be factors of market 
failure as labor is treated to be exogenous. For this economy, if growth-favoring factors 
of market failure outweigh the adverse ones we expect to have some positive values for 
θ . The larger the θ  for a given labor growth, the faster will be the growth and the larger 
will be the level of per capita income, and the smaller the value of θ , the slower the 
growth will be. Similarly, if adverse factors of market failure outweigh the favorable ones, 
we expect some negative values of θ  that entails deterioration of per capita. On the 
other hand, if the two contrary factors are at balance, we face stagnating economic 
growth.  
  
Returning to the subject of this paper, the “Africa Dummy”, the framework suggests in 
retrospect, that Africans have not done well in managing and exploiting factors of market 
failure. That is, the region has had relatively smaller size of θ , which may be either the 
effects of factors of market failure are generally low, or the adverse factors have counter 
acted the favorable ones, so that the net effect becomes smaller. In section four of this 
paper attempt will be made to see if this argument can be supported by empirical 
evidence.  
 
The framework also has some information on how growth process has taken place in 
advanced economies, when they were at indigent level. It suggests that the currently 
developed nations has managed to cross the point of indigent level, not by deferring the 
then current consumption and investing in physical capital, schooling and research and 
development, but through properly managing and exploiting possible factors of market 
failure. Once they passed that level, the arguments of deferred consumption for 
accumulation of physical capital, human capital can explain their growth process pretty 
well. 
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IV. Empirical Evidence: 
In this section, we need to see if an effect of factors of market failure in Sub Sahara Africa 
economies is uniquely different (smaller) from other part of the world. To this effect, first poor 
countries of the world, countries earning an average GNP per capita less than 3707, in 1960s 
(1960-1969) were taken. Second, from this set of countries SSA countries were sorted out and 
grouped under African subgroup, while the remaining poor countries were grouped under Non-
African subgroup. After forming such groupings, the proposed growth estimating equation was 
estimated for both subgroups, separately, and estimates of parameter θ  in both subgroups were 
compared for their size, sign and significance. The difference in magnitude of the estimates was 
used in deciding whether the argument has got some empirical grounds or not.  
 
The statistical data used for this purpose was taken from World Bank [2001]. The data set 
contains total labor force and gross domestic product per capita for 40 years (1960 – 1999) for a 
number of countries. From this data set, a total of 21 countries, earning an annual average GNP 
per capita below 370 in 1960s (1960-1969) were selected on the ground of data completeness, 
thirteen8 of them from SSA - while eight9 of them are non-Africans.  A brief description of the 
performances of the two subgroups is given in table-1.  
 
Table-1 Income Status of the Sample Countries 
 
Indicator Subgroup 
Average   
1960  - 1969 
Average 
1970  - 1999 
Average 
1960  - 1999 
African  239.48  278.14 268.84 GDP per Capita 
Average Non-African 206.44 368.76 328.18 
     
African  1.57 0.20 0.49 GDP per Capita 
Growth Average Non-African 1.61 3.12 2.77 
     
African  1.98 2.52 2.40 Labor Growth  
Average Non-African 1.90 2.40 2.28 
 
Table–1 reports the average GDP per capita and its growth in both subgroups for the 
base period 1960s as well as for the remaining decades up to 1999. In 1960s both 
Africans and Non-Africans were earning on the average below one dollar a day, and were 
having very close GDP per capita growth.  
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But they exhibited different level and rates of GDP per capita there after. The African 
subgroup was earning an average GDP per capita of $239.48 and altered this level to only 
$278.14 in the following three decades. On the other hand, the Non-African subgroup, 
earning an average GDP per capita of $206, again below a dollar a day in 1960s, managed 
to come to a level $368.76 in the following three decades. Here, it is possible to restate 
the problem at hand as whether such a gap is attributable to effect of factors of market 
failure. Similarly, the table reports that the GDP per capita growth of both subgroups 
were at a similar rate in 1960s, (1.57% for African and 1.61% for Non-African) but 
followed dissimilar path there after (0.2% and 3.12%, respectively). In this dimension, 
too, the exercise is to see if such a gap is attributable to effects of market failure.  
 
Using the data set used for this description, the parameter θ  in [6] is estimated for both 
subgroups using panel data analytic approach.  In forming the panel, the time series data 
of each country was averaged over five years and a total of eight periods were formed for 
each country in both subgroups. In the analysis, after taking natural logarism of [6], it was 
specified as One-Way error component regression model. Under this specification, 
estimates from the restricted or OLS (RM), the Fixed effect (FE), and Random Effect or 
GLS (RE) estimators were obtained. Here the superior estimator was chosen based on 
appropriate statistical tests. The results were given in table 2 and 3. 
 
Table –2: Parameter ''θ  Estimation for African Subgroup   
One-Way Error Component Regression Model 
Estimators Parameters Estimate of the 
parameter 
St. error of the 
parameter 
T-ratio p-value 
Aln  6.5123 0.4056 16.0552 0.0000 Restricted 
Model OLS θ  -0.0648 0.0272 -2.3876 0.0188 
Aln          Fixed Effect 
Model θ  0.145806 0.069525 2.09717 0.038427 
Aln  4.8222 0.6862 7.0271 0.0000 Random Effect 
Model θ  0.0487 0.0458 1.0633 0.2876 
Lagrange Multiplier test of RM vs. FE/RE 00000851392
2
.p,.
)(
==   χ  
Hausman test of FE vs. RE;  994600002
1
.p,.
)(
==   χ  
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For the African subgroup, to select appropriate estimator from the three given estimators 
first we test the pullabilty hypothesis, i.e. the appropriateness of constrained model or 
OLS estimator. In other words, the hypothesis of absence of country specific effects has 
to be examined. With N=13 T= 8 and k = 2, a Lagrange-multiplier test for significance 
of country specific effects yields a 2χ -value of 0000085139 .p,. =  . This is distributed as 
2
2 )(
χ under the null hypothesis of zero country specific effects. The null is soundly 
rejected, and the within or the random effect model is preferred to OLS estimator. That 
is, the test does not support the pullability of the data set, as there is strong country 
specific effects.  
 
Next, for a choice between random effects (GLS estimator) and within effect estimator a 
Hausman-test is performed. The basic assumption associated with random effect is that 
there is no correlation between the regressor and country specific effects. If such 
assumption is violated, then the GLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent. The test 
gave a 2χ value equal to ( )99460000 .p,. = . This is distributed as 2
1 )(
χ under the null 
hypothesis of absence of the indicated correlation. The test accepted strongly the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the country specific effect and the regressor, which 
in turn imply that the GLS estimator in this case is unbiased and consistent. As a result, 
the preferable estimate of the parameter θ for the African subgroup becomes 04870.ˆ =θ . 
This estimate was found to be insignificant at standard levels of significance, 28760.p =   , 
implying for the subgroup the effects of factors of market failure is not significantly 
different from zero during the covered period of study. By the same hand, lets try to 
estimate the parameter, θ , for Non-African subgroup. Applying the same procedure 
followed for African subgroup to the data set of Non-African subgroup, the results 
obtained are given in table 3. 
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Table –3: Parameter ''θ  Estimation for Non-African Poor Group   
One-Way Error Component Regression Model 
Estimators Parameters Estimate of the 
parameter 
St. error of the 
parameter 
T-ratio p-value 
Aln  5.51222 0.571133 9.65139 0.0000 Restricted 
Model OLS θ  0.006858 0.032934 0.208234 0.835729 
Aln          Fixed Effect 
Model θ  1.02488 0.113938 8.99512 0.0000 
Aln  0.353686 1.06183 0.333091 0.739066 Random Effect 
Model θ  0.306171 0.061074 5.0131 0.0000 
Lagrange Multiplier test of RM vs. FE/RE 0000048362
2
.p,.
)(
==   χ  
Hausman test of FE vs. RE;   934700102
1
.p,.
)(
==   χ  
 
In the Non-African subgroup, like the African subgroup, the model was specified an 
One-Way error component regression model. Next following the same procedure given 
above, Random Effect model was found to give preferable estimate of the parameterθ , 
which estimates the parameter to 30620.ˆ =θ . Unlike that of the former subgroup this 
estimate is significant at standard levels, ( )00000.p = . 
 
Next, lets try to see what is implied by the two sets of estimation. As indicated above, 
both subgroup were poor and were having similar rate of growth in 1960s. However, 
they followed different path of growth in subsequent decades. From the econometric 
analysis, we understand that effect of factors of market failure were not similar in two 
subgroups. In former subgroup it was found to be small and not significantly different 
from zero, while it was relatively larger and statistically different from zero for the later 
subgroup. Moreover, the magnitude of the parameter estimate in the later subgroup is 
about six fold of that of the former subgroup, confirming the hypothesis that effects of 
factors of market failure was smaller in the African subgroup. The Non-African 
subgroup, be it intentionally or not, has benefited significant gain from factors of market 
failure that has brought them to a level above poverty line in the latter periods.  
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V. Concluding Remarks 
One of the growth puzzles, the ‘Africa Dummy’ was examined by using somewhat 
different spectacle. The framework used to analyze the growth problem was designed by 
taking in to consideration the problem faced by poor agents in saving part of their 
income, rather than assuming it away. Moreover, the framework has tried to relax the 
common assumption of competitive equilibrium and focused on factors of market 
failure. The framework suggests that poor economies can exhibit per capita growth, by 
managing and exploiting factors of market failure. They remain poor only if they fail to 
do so. 
 
On this ground, the poor performance seen in SSA for the last four decades can be well 
attributed to poor capacity in managing and exploiting the indicated factors. In prospect, the 
analytic framework suggests the possibility of changing this trend of poor performance, so far as 
the implied necessary conditions are met. Managing and exploiting factors of market failure may 
require differentiating activities in the economy according to effects of factors of market failure 
associated with them, and developing mechanism of encouraging or promoting those activities 
with growth favoring effects and discouraging those with adverse effects.  
 
Furthermore, the framework has special message for poor African economies. It informs that 
they have to aim at managing and exploiting possible factors of market failures rather than 
undermining them or considering them as given. Relatively lesser attention has to be given to the 
recommendations that are actually beyond their capacities.  Finally, supporting Elbadawi (1996) 
argument, the paper tells us that there is no as such an adverse effect that arises from just being 
in Africa, or to be labeled as “Africa Dummy” in the process of economic growth. 
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Notes: 
                                                 
1 The data set is published in World Bank (2001) by the World Bank. 
 
2 The initial conditions include characteristics like, but not limited to, colonial history, ethnic 
diversity and tribal divisions, tropical climate, geographical factors e.g. access to sea etc.   
 
3 The argument requires agents’ attitude that involves sacrifice of current utility for the sake 
improved future welfare. However, for agents in subsistence life, such decision actually entails 
risk of passing away before attaining the foreseen greater earnings. As a result the rational 
decision makers may not be expected to sacrifice their life for the sake of improved future life. 
They may think like ‘what is the point of being rich corpse’. 
 
4 Most often the two papers are considered to press growth study forward after neoclassical 
growth approach. 
 
5 In deed, Romer (1990) managed to bring into play both monopoly power (one form of market 
imperfection) and spillovers (one form of market incompleteness) in his model. But the problem 
is not as such confined to imperfection due to monopoly. 
 
7 for this demarcation, see World Bank [1990] 
 
8 African Subgroup includes Malawi, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Mali, Chad, Gambia-The, Togo, Congo-Dem.Rep. and Benin 
 
9 Non-African Subgroup includes China, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka 
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